Black-and-white archival photograph of Maria Rychankova with her three young children after their liberation from the Ozarichi camps in Belarus, March 1944.

Maria Rychankova, from the village of Virichev, photographed with her three children after their liberation from Ozarichi on March 19, 1944. From left are Ivan, born in 1937, two-year-old Fenya in her mother's arms, and four-year-old Anya. Both girls subsequently died from the consequences of their imprisonment, Fenya on March 23 and Anya on March 29. Photograph: Semyon Alperin.

Ostkrieg.com • Eastern Front History • R. M. Dobo

In March 1944, the German Ninth Army forced tens of thousands of Soviet civilians into three exposed camps in the marshlands of Belarus. The prisoners were deliberately abandoned without adequate food, water, shelter, or medical assistance as German forces withdrew. Approximately 9,000 to 13,000 people died during the deportations and their immediate aftermath. Ozarichi was not an accidental humanitarian disaster. It was an organized military operation, planned and executed by the Wehrmacht.

An Army Retreats, and Civilians Become a Burden

By the spring of 1944, Germany's position on the Eastern Front had deteriorated considerably. The Red Army had recovered vast territories occupied since 1941, German formations were struggling to maintain increasingly exposed defensive positions, and Army Group Centre remained under considerable pressure in Belarus.

The Ninth Army, commanded by General Josef Harpe, occupied positions east of Bobruisk, where the front line extended into a difficult salient that German commanders wanted to shorten. The proposed withdrawal was militarily conventional: troops would abandon vulnerable positions, reduce the length of their defensive perimeter, and consolidate their remaining strength along a more manageable front.

What distinguished the operation was the treatment of civilians living behind those positions.

For nearly three years, German occupation authorities had exploited the population of Belarus for labour, agricultural production, transportation, and military support. Able-bodied men and women were frequently compelled to work for the occupying forces or deported to Germany as forced labourers. Their children, elderly relatives, and family members unable to work were often left behind, dependent upon communities already devastated by requisitions, destruction, and displacement.

As the Germans retreated, they also drove civilians westward to prevent the Soviet Union from recovering their labour and resources. Each withdrawal therefore brought additional displaced people into the shrinking territory still under German control.

The Ninth Army confronted a humanitarian crisis that German occupation policies had helped create. Instead of providing relief or allowing civilians to remain in their homes, its commanders chose to remove those they considered incapable of contributing to the German war effort.

Children, elderly people, disabled civilians, and the sick were to be expelled from the army's area of responsibility.

The military withdrawal provided the opportunity.

The Decision of March 9, 1944

On March 9, 1944, senior officers and quartermasters of the Ninth Army assembled to coordinate the proposed civilian deportations. The arrangements were incorporated into an operation directed by Harpe's headquarters, with instructions passed to the subordinate corps and divisions.

Although the original army order has not survived, its contents can be reconstructed through German operational diaries and subsequent reports. These records establish that the operation was planned at army level, with transport, collection points, guard detachments, and receiving camps assigned to participating formations.

The initial scheme envisaged approximately 20,000 civilians. German records identified the intended deportees as people suffering from epidemic diseases, disabled persons, the elderly, women with more than two children under ten, and others considered incapable of working.

The categories reveal the central principle governing the operation. Civilians were being sorted according to their usefulness to the occupying army, with those unable to provide labour or other services designated for removal.

The Ninth Army's quartermaster organization assumed a leading role. The 35th, 110th, and 129th Infantry Divisions participated in preparing camps, transporting prisoners, or supplying guards, while other divisions across the army's sector collected civilians for deportation.

The operation also involved approximately 150 members of Sonderkommando 7a, a detachment of the Security Service associated with Einsatzgruppe B, the SS mobile killing organization operating in occupied Soviet territory.

This cooperation was important, but it did not make the deportations an exclusively SS operation. The Wehrmacht issued the orders, supplied much of the transport and personnel, organized the collection system, and incorporated the operation into its military withdrawal.

The deportations began at approximately 04:00 on March 12.

The Road to Ozarichi

The civilians were assembled across an extensive area of occupied Belarus, while some had already been displaced from other parts of the Soviet Union during earlier German withdrawals.

Families were driven from their homes or transferred from existing holding areas. Some travelled in railway wagons, others in trucks or horse-drawn vehicles, while many were required to march considerable distances despite illness, exhaustion, and inadequate clothing.

The principal railway reception point was Rudobelka, where the 129th Infantry Division established a collection camp. Originally intended to accommodate approximately 6,000 people, the site received an estimated 12,000 to 16,000 during the operation's busiest days.

From there, prisoners were transferred towards the final enclosures in the marshland near Ozarichi and the surrounding settlements, including Dert and Podosinnik.

The transportation system was overwhelmed almost immediately. An operation designed around 20,000 civilians was soon dealing with more than twice that number.

The consequences were particularly severe for children and the elderly. Prisoners had to continue marching regardless of their physical condition, and witnesses later described German guards beating or shooting those who fell behind.

The killings were not confined to the recollections of survivors. German documentation also recorded deaths during transportation and acknowledged the brutality surrounding the movements of prisoners.

A particularly revealing recommendation appeared in the Ninth Army's subsequent operational report: future deportation columns should be accompanied by burial detachments to dispose of bodies along the route.

Rather than reconsidering the operation, the army was examining how to administer similar deportations more efficiently.

The administrative language is significant. Ozarichi was documented through the ordinary machinery of military logistics, with records of trains, available transport, camp capacities, escorts, and the numbers of civilians moved.

For the deportees, however, these administrative calculations meant being removed from whatever remained of their communities and delivered into conditions in which survival was increasingly uncertain.

Three Camps Without Shelter

Black-and-white photograph of a snow-covered forest enclosure at Ozarichi. Barbed wire stretches between trees, with bodies lying on the ground near the camp perimeter.

The barbed-wire perimeter of an Ozarichi camp, photographed on March 18, 1944. Bodies lie on the snowy ground near the fencing, where German forces had laid mines. Prisoners had been confined outdoors without adequate food, water, shelter, or medical care. Photograph: Yevgeny Podshivalov.

The camps near Ozarichi were unlike the established concentration camp complexes elsewhere in German-occupied Europe.

There were no permanent barracks, extensive industrial facilities, or developed systems for housing prisoners. The enclosures consisted largely of open forest and marshland surrounded by barbed wire, with rudimentary guard positions and few facilities.

Prisoners were exposed to the weather during March, when freezing nights, wet ground, and inadequate clothing created dangerous conditions.

Food supplies were insufficient, clean drinking water was largely unavailable, and sanitary facilities were absent. German guards prevented prisoners from lighting fires, partly because the army wished to conceal the operation from Soviet forces until its withdrawal was complete.

Survivors recalled collecting snow for water and attempting to protect family members from the cold with whatever clothing or possessions they still had.

The camp boundaries became another means of killing. German guards fired on prisoners approaching the wire, while mines and other obstacles made movement dangerous even after the principal guarding units withdrew.

The absence of buildings or adequate food was not an unavoidable consequence of a sudden evacuation. The army had deliberately selected the sites and organized the transportation of civilians into them without arranging the necessities of survival.

One contemporary German witness was the military chaplain Josef Perau, who encountered the deportations in March 1944. His account describes the collective cries coming from the prisoners, bodies beside the roads, and children abandoned or killed during the marches.

Perau's observations are important because they provide contemporary evidence from within the German military establishment itself, separate from the Soviet investigations conducted after liberation.

The suffering was already visible to German personnel while the operation was underway.

Typhus and the Use of Disease

A particularly disturbing aspect of Ozarichi was the deliberate inclusion of civilians suffering from epidemic typhus.

The disease, transmitted primarily through infected body lice, flourished where people were crowded together without adequate hygiene, clean clothing, or medical treatment. German commanders regarded infected civilians as a threat to the health of their own troops and sought to remove them from the territory they controlled.

An estimated 7,000 people already suffering from disease were brought into the camps, including civilians removed from quarantine settlements.

They were not effectively separated from prisoners who were still healthy.

In the overcrowded enclosures, where sanitary conditions were catastrophic, the deliberate mixing of infected and uninfected civilians increased the danger of transmission. People already weakened by hunger and exposure were exceptionally vulnerable.

Soviet investigators subsequently argued that the Germans had intended not only to kill civilians through disease but also to infect advancing Soviet soldiers and the surrounding population.

That allegation was presented at the Nuremberg trials.

The surviving German records establish that military authorities knowingly transferred infected civilians into the camps and understood the danger of typhus. They also show that removing the infected population from German-controlled territory was an explicit objective.

The extent to which deliberately infecting Soviet troops was a separately formulated operational objective is more difficult to establish from the surviving German documentation. Historians therefore need to distinguish the demonstrated policy of removing infected civilians and knowingly exposing others from the broader Soviet allegation concerning biological warfare against the Red Army.

This distinction does not lessen the crime.

The German commanders deliberately assembled vulnerable people, including those with a dangerous infectious disease, in conditions where the spread of illness and mass mortality were foreseeable.

They then abandoned them as the front line moved.

The Withdrawal and the Red Army's Arrival

Black-and-white archival photograph showing civilians leaving the Ozarichi concentration camp following its liberation in March 1944.

Soviet civilians leaving the Ozarichi camp following the arrival of the Red Army, March 19, 1944. German forces had abandoned tens of thousands of people in exposed enclosures as they withdrew westward. The survivors faced continuing dangers from illness, exhaustion, and mines around the former camps. Photograph: Semyon Alperin.

By March 16, the principal deportations had been completed, and the German Army was preparing to abandon the forward positions around the camps.

During the night of March 16–17, German formations withdrew to their revised defensive line, leaving the prisoners behind in the territory between the opposing forces.

The German withdrawal did not immediately bring freedom. Mines remained around the enclosures, and the approach of Soviet troops was complicated by the dangerous terrain and the possibility of German fire.

The surviving records place Soviet contact with the camps around March 18–19, 1944. Elements of the Soviet 65th Army, part of the 1st Belorussian Front, reached the area and began the work of freeing the prisoners.

What they discovered was a humanitarian catastrophe.

Thousands of civilians had already died, while many survivors were severely weakened by hunger, disease, and exposure. Children were especially numerous among those requiring assistance.

Black-and-white wartime photograph of sick former Ozarichi prisoners waiting to be transported for hospital treatment following their liberation.

Sick survivors of the Ozarichi camps waiting for transportation to a hospital following liberation in March 1944. Soviet medical personnel faced the enormous task of treating civilians suffering from starvation, exposure, and infectious diseases, including epidemic typhus. Photograph: Semyon Alperin.

One survivor, Valentina Shishlo, was eight years old when she was deported with her mother and siblings. She later recalled the morning when the German guards were gone and the surviving prisoners realized that Soviet soldiers were approaching.

Her testimony also describes the danger of the mined camp perimeter. Some prisoners rushed towards the approaching soldiers before understanding that the ground around them was still dangerous.

Shishlo lost three younger brothers during her imprisonment and required treatment in a military hospital after liberation.

Her account illustrates the limits of describing Ozarichi only through military records or casualty statistics. Behind the army's transport calculations were families whose children had been taken into the camps, whose relatives had died, and whose lives would remain marked by the experience long after the fighting moved west.

The Red Army faced an immediate and considerable medical burden. Soviet personnel had to clear mines, evacuate survivors, establish treatment facilities, and manage the danger of epidemic disease.

Medical assistance continued after the liberation itself. Soviet records indicate that thousands of former prisoners, including large numbers of children, required hospitalization.

The German plan had therefore accomplished another of its objectives: leaving a crisis for Soviet authorities to confront while the Wehrmacht consolidated its position farther west.

How Many People Died?

The exact number of civilians deported to Ozarichi cannot be established with complete certainty.

German military records contain several figures. The Ninth Army's quartermaster documentation recorded 39,597 adults, together with several thousand children who were not included in that total. Sonderkommando 7a recorded 47,461 deportees.

The available evidence therefore supports an approximate total of 40,000 to 50,000 civilians.

Following the liberation, Soviet authorities reported discovering approximately 33,000 survivors and 9,000 dead.

Subsequent historical and memorial research commonly places the death toll at approximately 9,000 to 13,000, although the figures cannot be treated as an exact count.

The uncertainty reflects several difficulties, including incomplete records, deaths during transport, the dispersed locations of the camps, and the possibility that some survivors died after evacuation from illnesses contracted during imprisonment.

Whatever the final figure, the scale is unmistakable.

Tens of thousands of civilians were deported in an operation lasting approximately one week, and thousands died as a direct consequence of decisions taken by the German military command.

Nor were all deaths the result of exposure or disease. The surviving evidence also establishes killings by guards during the deportations and within the camp system.

Ozarichi was consequently not simply a case of insufficient supplies during a difficult military retreat. The starvation, exposure, shootings, and epidemics occurred within a deliberately constructed system of confinement.

The Wehrmacht's Responsibility

The significance of Ozarichi extends well beyond the number of victims.

For decades after the Second World War, a popular distinction separated the supposedly professional German Army from the crimes committed by the SS and Nazi security organizations. Although that interpretation has been comprehensively challenged by historical scholarship, it contributed to the marginalization of atrocities in which regular military formations played a central role.

Ozarichi provides unusually direct evidence of Wehrmacht responsibility.

The Ninth Army's headquarters organized the operation. Its subordinate formations collected and transported the deportees. Its supply services participated in running the camp system, and its soldiers helped guard prisoners and enforce the conditions of confinement.

The operation was documented through German military orders, war diaries, statistical returns, and post-operation assessments.

The surviving records also demonstrate that the army regarded the deportations as an operational success.

In its report of March 28, 1944, Ninth Army headquarters described the operation as providing substantial relief and recorded practical recommendations for carrying out similar deportations elsewhere. Those recommendations addressed railway loading, the management of prisoners, and the organization of future transports.

One instruction explained that railway wagons could hold more prisoners than originally anticipated because children occupied less space.

This was not the language of an institution investigating an unforeseen disaster.

It was the language of an army refining a method of removing civilians from its area of operations.

Investigation, Justice, and Historical Memory

A large grey stone monument with sculpted figures representing civilian victims of Ozarichi stands in a clearing surrounded by pine trees. Flowers and wreaths rest at its base.

The Ozarichi memorial complex in Belarus, commemorating the civilians who died in the camps established by the German Ninth Army in March 1944. The monument depicts the suffering of women, children, and elderly prisoners, while its surrounding forest recalls the environment in which the deportees were confined.

Soviet authorities began investigating the camps shortly after liberation, gathering survivor testimony, examining the sites, and collecting material concerning the German units involved.

The Soviet Extraordinary State Commission incorporated Ozarichi into its investigation of crimes committed during the German occupation.

Evidence concerning the camps was subsequently presented at Nuremberg in February 1946, when Soviet prosecutor Lev Smirnov described the confinement of civilians without shelter and the deliberate inclusion of prisoners suffering from infectious disease.

The Soviet investigations were conducted within a political and propaganda environment, and their individual findings require critical examination. Nevertheless, the central facts concerning the operation are independently supported by surviving German documentation and later archival research.

Some perpetrators were prosecuted.

Generalleutnant Johann-Georg Richert, commander of the 35th Infantry Division, was convicted at a Soviet military trial in Minsk and executed on January 30, 1946. His involvement in the Ozarichi deportations formed part of the case against him.

Other senior figures escaped judicial accountability for their roles in the operation. These included Ninth Army commander Josef Harpe and Helmuth Looss, who commanded Sonderkommando 7a.

The crime remained part of Belarusian wartime memory, although it received far less international attention than many other examples of Nazi mass murder.

Memorials now commemorate the victims, while German and Belarusian historians have reconstructed the operation through military records, survivor testimony, judicial proceedings, photographs, and film.

The research of historians Christoph Rass and René Rohrkamp has been particularly important in establishing how the camps were organized and how the participating Wehrmacht formations contributed to the operation.

Their findings connect the deaths at Ozarichi to the broader structures of occupation, forced labour, military administration, and German withdrawal policies in the Soviet Union.

A Crime Written into the Military Record

Ozarichi reveals an aspect of the German war in the East that is difficult to understand through conventional battlefield narratives alone.

The camps were not created because the German Army lacked the organizational capacity to move or supply civilians. The Wehrmacht demonstrated considerable administrative ability in collecting tens of thousands of people, coordinating railway movements, organizing escorts, constructing enclosures, and recording the results.

Those capabilities were directed towards an operation that deliberately exposed civilians to death.

The people selected were overwhelmingly those least capable of surviving such treatment: children, elderly men and women, disabled people, and civilians already weakened by disease.

The army had exploited the labour of their relatives, destroyed much of the economic and social environment upon which they depended, and then classified the remaining population as a burden to be discarded.

By leaving them in the path of the Red Army, German commanders transferred the consequences of their own occupation policies to the advancing enemy.

Ozarichi was therefore both a mass atrocity and an expression of the military logic that had developed during Germany's war of annihilation against the Soviet Union.

Its importance lies partly in the extraordinary survival of the documentary record. The planning meetings, deportation orders, transportation figures, and assessments written by German personnel make it possible to trace responsibility through the regular military command structure.

The victims did not die because war had accidentally overtaken a temporary refugee camp.

They died because an army had organized their abandonment.

And when the operation was finished, that same army considered how its methods might be used again.


Sources and Further Reading

1. Christoph Rass and René Rohrkamp, “The Concentration Camps near Ozarichi.” A detailed study based on German operational documentation, Soviet investigations, judicial records, and survivor testimony. The principal source for the command structure, planning, transportation, and camp organization.

https://azarycy1944.nghm-uos.de/en/the-concentrations-camps-near-ozarichi/

2. Research Group Azaryčy 1944, University of Osnabrück. A historical research project presenting contemporary military documents, eyewitness accounts, archival evidence, and material concerning post-war remembrance.

https://azarycy1944.nghm-uos.de/en/

3. Harvard Law School Library, Nuremberg Trials Project. Transcript of the International Military Tribunal proceedings of February 19, 1946, including the Soviet prosecution's presentation concerning Ozarichi and the Extraordinary State Commission's findings.

https://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/transcripts/7?seq=4652

4. Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, Memorial to the Victims of the Ozarichi Camps. Historical overview, casualty estimates, participating German units, and the development of the memorial.

https://www.memorialmuseums.org/memorialmuseum/memorial-to-the-victims-of-the-ozarichi-camps?locale=en

5. Museum Berlin-Karlshorst, “Ozarichi 1944: Event and Memory.” Research presentation featuring historians Christoph Rass and Aliaksandr Dalhouski, addressing Wehrmacht responsibility and the remembrance of the crime.

https://www.museum-karlshorst.de/en/your-visit/history-in-conflict/

6. Research Group Azaryčy 1944, “Here They Come, Our Rescuers.” The testimony of survivor Valentina Shishlo, documenting the liberation, the mined perimeter, and her family's losses.

https://azarycy1944.nghm-uos.de/en/walentina-schischlo/


Ostkrieg | The Eastern Front, 1939–1945